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Abstract 
To date, only a few studies have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of 
disability employment quota systems using structural changes in policies. 
This study exploits the structural changes in South Korea’s disability 
employment quota system that took place in 2004 and 2006 to expand the 
current disability policy evaluation literature. We separate the effect of these 
changes in the quota system into their effect on the probability of labour 
force participation and their effect on the probability of employment (after 
controlling for selection into the labour market). We also study the extent to 
which the changes – which included increasing the number of employers 
covered by the quota system, the number of jobs available to individuals 
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with disabilities and the financial incentives for employing individuals  
with disabilities – have affected job satisfaction among individuals with 
disabilities. Our results suggest that the changes in the quota system may 
have increased labour force participation but have had a limited positive 
impact on the probability of employment among people with disabilities in 
South Korea. Further, compulsory hiring and expanded opportunities have 
not substantially affected the level of job satisfaction observed among 
employees with disabilities relative to their non-disabled counterparts. 
Policy points 
• Using the structural changes in South Korea’s disability employment 
quota system between 2004 and 2006 targeted at increasing the number 
of employers covered by the quota system, the number of jobs available 
to individuals with disabilities and the financial incentives for employing 
individuals with disabilities, we investigate the effect of new policy 
initiatives on various labour market outcomes of the targeted group of 
individuals relative to non-disabled counterparts.  
• Our results suggest that the new initiatives may have increased labour 
force participation but have had a limited positive impact on the 
probability of employment among people with disabilities in South 
Korea.  
• The new initiatives have not substantially affected the level of job 
satisfaction observed among employees with disabilities relative to their 
non-disabled counterparts.  
• As the US and other developed countries consider their own disability 
employment situations, they can learn from studies such as this one on 
the effectiveness of quota systems.  
I. Introduction 
In the US, approximately 11 per cent of the federal budget is directed to 
agencies, departments and other entities to support disability services and 
income maintenance for individuals with disabilities.1 Although the greatest 
proportion of these funds in the US (about 85 per cent) is allocated to long-
term care, health care and income maintenance, around 15 per cent is 
dedicated to various educational and training activities targeted at getting 
individuals with disabilities into competitive employment. Despite 
distributing vast monetary resources to such programmes, many developed 
societies, including the US, have insufficient labour force attachment among 
the segment of the population with disabilities. For example, in the US, the 
1Braddock, 2010. 
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employment rate among individuals with disabilities is more than 42 
percentage points lower than that for individuals without disabilities.2 The 
story is similar in other Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) member countries, where employment rates for 
people with disabilities are, on average, just above 40 per cent, about half of 
the rate for people without a disability.3  
To improve the labour market situation of individuals with disabilities, 
most developed societies have introduced a variety of employment policies 
directed at enhancing the participation of individuals with disabilities in the 
labour force. These policies can be broken down into two main types. The 
first type is policies that introduce quota systems obligating employers of a 
certain size to have a workforce with a certain percentage of individuals with 
disabilities. For example, Austria, Germany and South Korea use 
employment quotas as a means to improve labour market outcomes of 
individuals with disabilities. The second type of disability employment 
policies is anti-discriminatory laws, which do not directly incentivise 
employers to hire and retain individuals with disabilities, but instead are 
intended to eliminate employment discrimination. These anti-discrimination 
laws typically prohibit discrimination in hiring, firing, wages and other parts 
of the employment process and require employers to provide reasonable 
accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities to facilitate their 
labour market attachment. Laws that prohibit employers from making hiring 
or employment decisions based on the presence of disability were adopted in 
the early 1990s by a number of developed countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand and the US. Several countries, including South Korea, have 
implemented both of these types of policies.  
A large body of literature has attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of 
these different types of disability employment policies.4 In the current 
literature, there is mixed evidence on the relative effectiveness of these 
policy initiatives. For example, one group of studies5 found that the 
enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the anti-
discrimination law in the US, led to a substantial decline in the employment 
rate for individuals with disabilities compared with their non-disabled peers. 
Theoretically, we can explain the negative effect by the strict requirement of 
reasonable accommodation or non-discrimination in wages, which may have 
inadvertently increased employer costs related to employing individuals with 
disabilities, presumably decreasing the hiring rate. That is, employers may 
have become concerned that hiring people with disabilities will require 
2Erickson, Lee and von Schrader, 2012. 
3OECD, 2009. 
4For example, DeLeire (2000), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Beegle and Stock (2003), Kruse and 
Schur (2003), Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2003), Hotchkiss (2004), Verick (2004), Bell and 
Heitmueller (2005), Lalive, Wuellrich and Zweimüller (2009), Wuellrich (2010) and Ryu et al. (2010). 
5DeLeire, 2000; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001. 
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expensive workplace accommodations and/or employing people who cannot 
achieve productivity standards for particular jobs. Furthermore, the 
requirement of non-discrimination in firing may have increased the costs 
associated with hiring workers with disabilities. Jolls and Prescott (2004) 
estimated the effect of different components of the legislation on 
employment and found that the reasonable accommodation requirement may 
have been a main source of a decline in employment among individuals with 
disabilities in the first years after the enactment of the ADA, rather than 
prohibitions against discrimination in wages, hiring, firing and promotion. 
However, a more recent group of studies6 demonstrated that the enactment 
of the ADA was not a source of decline in the employment rate among 
people with disabilities. In fact, Hotchkiss (2004) uncovered that the 
unconditional probability of employment among individuals with disabilities 
(after controlling for selection into the labour market) had not declined after 
the enactment of the ADA, and may have actually improved for certain 
groups of individuals with disabilities. 
To date, only a few studies have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness 
of employment quota systems using structural changes in employment 
policies. Conceptually, we expect that an increase in the level of penalty/ 
subsidy or a decrease in the minimum employer size incentivises employers 
to hire and retain more workers with disabilities in the workplace, since the 
marginal benefit of hiring and retaining a disabled worker increases after the 
expansion of the quota system. Further, a decrease in the minimum employer 
size to be covered by the quota leads to additional employment opportunities 
for people with disabilities. Verick (2004) evaluated the 2001 disability 
employment reform in Germany that decreased the quota rate by 1 
percentage point (from 6 per cent to 5 per cent) and increased the minimum 
employer size covered by the law from 16 to 20 workers. The study found 
the changes in the quota system in Germany had no impact on the 
employment rate of individuals with severe disabilities. In Austria, in 2001, 
the penalty for not complying with the quota rate was increased by almost 30 
per cent. Wuellrich (2010) found that this increase in penalty considerably 
increased firms’ demand for disabled workers. Somewhat similar results for 
the same tax initiative in Austria were reported by Lalive, Wuellrich and 
Zweimüller (2009). Finally, Ryu et al. (2010) found that the changes in the 
South Korean quota system in 2001, increasing the subsidies to employers 
hiring targeted individuals with disabilities – specifically, those with severe 
disabilities and women with disabilities – led to a 4.7 percentage point 
decrease in the employment gap between individuals with and without 
disabilities. 
The aim of this study is to add to the limited evaluation literature on 
quota systems by investigating to what extent the structural changes in 
6Kruse and Schur, 2003; Hotchkiss, 2004. 
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disability employment regulations that took place in South Korea in the 
middle of the 2000s affected the employment rate and subsequent job 
satisfaction of individuals with disabilities. Although the quota system in 
South Korea was adopted more than two decades ago, the system 
experienced substantial transformation between 2004 and 2006. Specifically, 
in 2004, the minimum size of employers who were obligated to comply with 
the quota system changed from 300 employees to 50 employees. This drastic 
change in the rules increased the number of available vacancies for 
individuals with disabilities in the whole South Korean labour market by 
approximately 20,000 units.7 At the same time, subsidies to employers who 
employed above the required level of individuals with disabilities increased 
substantially in South Korea.8 Furthermore, at the beginning of 2006, the 
number of vacancies in the public sector for individuals with disabilities was 
substantially increased, by approximately 30,000 units,9 due to an increase in 
the number of jobs for which individuals with disabilities became eligible to 
apply. Previously, individuals with disabilities were ineligible to apply to 
certain positions in the public sector. Moreover, in 2006, companies with 
hazardous work environments (for example, mining, construction and 
security guard) were expected to start complying with the disability 
employment quota, whereas previously they were excluded from  
disability employment obligations or their employment quota was smaller 
than that for other companies. Also at the beginning of 2006, the penalties 
for not complying with the recommended rate for employing individuals 
with disabilities were substantially increased.  
All these changes in the quota system have allegedly led to better 
employment situations among individuals with disabilities in South Korea.10 
However, the effect of these changes in the quota system on the probability 
of employment (after controlling for selection into the labour market) has yet 
to be investigated. Unlike many studies in the literature, our study goes 
beyond simply studying the effect of new initiatives on the conditional 
probability of employment. We separate the effect of the changes in the 
quota system in South Korea into two effects: the effect on the probability of 
labour force participation and the effect on the unconditional probability of 
employment (after controlling for selection into the labour market). Our 
approach resembles the empirical strategy suggested by Hotchkiss (2004) in 
her inquiry into the effect of the ADA on the employment rate of individuals 
with disabilities. In separate analyses, we also investigate to what extent the 
changes in the quota system have improved the employment prospects of the 
more disabled segment of the population and whether the changes in the 
7Yoo et al., 2010. 
8Ryu et al., 2010. 
9Yoo et al., 2010. 
10Ryu et al., 2010. 
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quota system are associated with increasing job satisfaction among all 
individuals with disabilities.  
II. Background on the South Korean quota system 
In South Korea, a number of laws have been signed in the last three decades 
to address unmet needs of individuals with disabilities. Table 1 summarises 
laws, amendments and changes in regulations related to the disability quota 
system in South Korea in the last three decades. The backbone of the South 
Korean disability employment doctrine was the adoption of the quota system 
in 1990 with the enactment of the Disability Employment Promotion Act. 
The objective of this new initiative was to advance employment and self-
sufficiency among individuals with disabilities in South Korea. According to 
the new law, employers with at least 300 workers were obligated to ensure 
employees with disabilities composed at least 2.5 per cent of their 
workforce. Under the quota system, individuals register with a local 
government agency to obtain a certification of disability. This certification is 
then shared with the employer in the hiring process. Disability registration is 
not required, but an individual must register if he/she wants to receive 
several welfare benefits from government. Also, if an individual is not 
registered, he/she will not be considered by an employer and the government  
 
TABLE 1 
Laws, amendments and changes in regulations 
related to the disability quota system in South Korea 
Date Description 
13 January 1990 Enactment of the Disability Employment Promotion Act (DEPA). The 
law introduced the quota system obligating employers with more than 
300 employees to have a workforce with at least 2.5 per cent of 
individuals having disabilities. 
12 January 2000 Revision of the previous Act, changing the title of the Act to Disability 
Employment Promotion and Vocational Rehabilitation Act. 
29 January 2004 Minimum size of employers obligated to comply with the quota system 
changed from 300 employees to 50 employees. 
29 January 2004 Subsidies to employers who employed individuals with disabilities 
beyond the specified level increased substantially.  
1 January 2006 Penalties (subsidies) for not complying (complying) with the 
recommended rate for employing individuals with disabilities increased 
substantially. 
1 January 2006 Number of companies obligated to employ disabled individuals 
expanded. In 2006, companies with hazardous work environments (e.g. 
mining, construction, security guard) were expected to start complying 
with the disability employment quota. Furthermore, the number of 
vacancies for individuals with disabilities was increased in the public 
sector with the exception of police, safety and escort services. 
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as an individual with a disability in the disability employment rate 
calculation in the organisation. 
The key feature of any employment quota system is a non-compliance 
tax. Any non-complier whose workforce does not meet the recommended 
rate for employing people with disabilities must pay a penalty for each non-
employed individual with a disability. In South Korea, the amount of this 
penalty per worker is calculated based on the average monthly cost that the 
average employer incurs for employing one individual with a disability. For 
example, in 2003, the penalty was set at the level of 437,000 KRW  
(1,129 KRW = 1 USD) per worker per month and it has been steadily 
increasing since that year owing to steady inflation. In 2006, the South 
Korean government imposed additional penalties for the firms that either 
completely refused to comply with disability employment regulations or 
employed only half or less of the recommended level. In particular, if the 
workforce did not include any individuals with disabilities, the employer had 
to pay a penalty corresponding to the minimum wage amount in South Korea 
(700,600 KRW) for each non-employed individual with a disability. If the 
workforce included half or fewer of the recommended level of individuals 
with disabilities, in addition to the ordinary non-compliance tax for each 
non-employed worker, the employer had to pay an extra 255,000 KRW per 
worker per month.  
To encourage further inclusion of individuals with disabilities in 
competitive employment, the South Korean government embedded into its 
employment quota system some financial incentives for the firms that 
employ above the recommended level of individuals with disabilities. This 
way, the South Korean government implicitly subsidises the wages of 
individuals with disabilities in such firms. Specifically, a firm that  
employs individuals with disabilities at a rate higher than officially required 
receives a monetary reward for each worker with a disability above the legal 
obligatory disability employment rate. The monetary reward could be even 
higher for employing either severely disabled individuals or females with 
disabilities. In 2003, the per-worker monetary reward was about  
474,000 KRW. In 2004, the reward was increased by about 30 per cent.  
The changes in the quota system from 2004 to 2006 are the focus of this 
paper. Two of the changes substantially increased the number of jobs 
available for individuals with disabilities. First, in 2004, the minimum size 
of employers who were obligated to comply with the employment quota 
decreased from 300 employees to 50 employees. Second, at the beginning of 
2006, the types of occupations for which individuals with disabilities could 
be considered were broadened. This enabled individuals with disabilities to 
be hired for the majority of public jobs with the exception of police, safety 
and escort services. Furthermore, for individuals with disabilities, there was 
an increase in opportunities in hazardous sectors. At the beginning of 2006, 
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there were two other changes to the system related to monetary incentives 
for employers: increased penalties for non-compliance with the quota system 
and increased rewards for surpassing the quota rate. 
III. Model 
The principal interest of this study is to understand whether the changes in 
the quota system between 2004 and 2006 had any impact on employment 
outcomes for individuals with disabilities in South Korea. Our empirical 
strategy is quite similar to the strategy employed by Hotchkiss (2004) in 
understanding the impact of the ADA legislation on labour market outcomes 
for individuals with disabilities in the US. Specifically, we assume that 
factors associated with the propensity to be in the labour force, *1iY , and the 
propensity to work, *2iY , can be modelled by the following binary response 
model with sample selection:11 
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In the above model, X1i and X2i are the individual characteristics that we 
believe to affect respectively an individual’s labour force participation and 
employment decisions. The primary variable of interest is an indicator, Di, of 
whether the individual has a disability. Finally, we assume that  
(3) 
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The above expressions imply that to account for the fact that the 
employment decision is defined only if the individual participates in the 
labour force, we should allow for correlation of the normally distributed 
error terms across two equations. The above relationship between two 
11Wooldridge, 2010. 
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outcome equations is also known as a bivariate probit with selection. We 
estimate jointly equations (1) and (2) for each year from 2003 to 2007. To 
compute the marginal effect of disability on labour force participation and 
employment decisions, we compute predicted employment and labour force 
participation probabilities for the entire sample, varying the disability index 
in the sample between 0 and 1. This method, discussed by Cameron and 
Trivedi (2010, p. 343), allows one to compute a measure of the effect of a 
discrete change in a dummy variable such as disability on the probability of 
a certain event. After averaging the predicted probabilities separately for two 
different values of the disability index, we then plot the data points in one 
graph to track visually any changes in employment and labour force 
participation patterns in South Korea among individuals with disabilities 
after major changes in the disability quota system between 2004 and 2006.  
For the purpose of identification, equation (1) modelling individuals’ 
labour force participation decisions should have at least one variable that is 
not in equation (2) describing individuals’ employment decisions. Similar to 
Hotchkiss (2004), we use ‘non-labour income’ as an exclusion restriction to 
identify the parameters of a binary response model with sample selection. 
Other than this exclusion restriction variable, X1i and X2i include the same 
variables: age, age squared, self-reported health, gender, marital status, 
education, province unemployment rate and region fixed effects. We group 
provinces into the five main regions based on GDP per capita data. 
Specifically, the first region includes the provinces with GDP per capita 
below 25,000 USD. Then, for the subsequent regions, we increase GDP per 
capita incrementally by 10,000 USD. The fifth region, which represents the 
region with GDP per capita above 55,000 USD, is actually represented by 
the single province, Ulsan. 
To conduct a robustness check, we also estimate the bivariate probit 
model with selection pooling all years of data together. We introduce year 
fixed effects using the calendar year 2003 as a reference year. By cross-
multiplying the newly-constructed year fixed effects with the disability 
indicator, this should allow us to test whether the employment and labour 
force participation probabilities for individuals with disabilities are 
substantially changed relative to the probabilities for non-disabled 
counterparts after the changes in the quota system. This approach is also 
known as a ‘difference-in-difference’ approach. Taking into account the 
longitudinal aspect of the data, the observations corresponding to the same 
individual within the pooled sample will inevitably be correlated, leading to 
inefficient point estimates. To address this statistical issue, we estimate the 
bivariate probit model with selection using the pooled sample with cluster-
robust standard errors.  
The structure of the longitudinal survey used in this study enables 
identification of multiple disabling conditions. This facilitates an 
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investigation of the extent to which the severity of the disabling condition 
affects the employment prospects of the typical disabled individual before 
and after changes in the quota system in South Korea. Also, most 
importantly, the availability of multiple measures of disability creates an 
opportunity to test directly the relative importance of subsidies for the 
employment prospects of the typical individual with a disability. For 
example, if subsidies do not have any direct implications for the employment 
prospects of individuals with disabilities, then changes in the level of 
employment should not vary substantially across individuals with different 
severities of disability. If the level of subsidies has an effect on firms’ 
employment strategies, then individuals with more severe disabilities may 
have a higher chance of finding employment after an increase in the level of 
subsidy. The alternative conjecture is that the regulation somehow alters the 
individual’s decision to register officially as a disabled worker to benefit 
from the increasing demand for disabled workers. To test this hypothesis, we 
estimate the bivariate probit model with selection controlling for a set of 
dummies indicating the number of disabling conditions – the variables that 
we use as a proxy for disability severity – and the interaction of this new set 
of variables with a time dummy identifying observations corresponding to 
2006 and 2007, the years following the major changes in the quota system. 
The magnitude of the parameters associated with the interaction terms 
should increase with the number of disabling conditions to support the given 
hypothesis. 
Finally, we perform a sub-analysis to understand whether, after the 
changes in the quota system, individuals with disabilities in South Korea 
perceive higher satisfaction with their current jobs, employers, wages, 
contents of performed work, etc. than individuals without disabilities. We 
hypothesise that due to a larger pool of available job vacancies generated by 
the changes in disability employment regulations, people with disabilities 
will have better employment opportunities and eventually move to less 
marginal employment arrangements after the major changes in the quota 
system. Furthermore, we conjecture that people with disabilities will 
experience a greater increase in job satisfaction than non-disabled peers. To 
document whether overall job satisfaction has improved among individuals 
with disabilities relative to non-disabled peers, we use a conventional chi-
square test where we compare the proportions of individuals with disabilities 
who agreed or were satisfied with certain criteria of their employment across 
two years, 2003 and 2007. We perform a similar comparison test separately 
for the sample of individuals without disabilities. 
A simple comparison of proportions across two years somewhat mimics a 
‘difference-in-difference’ approach; however, in contrast to that approach, 
we do not control for other observed factors within a regression due to 
insufficient sample size. The insufficient sample size is an artefact of the low 
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employment rate among individuals with disabilities, employed people with 
disabilities being the segment of the disabled population who responded to 
job satisfaction items. Therefore, we cannot disentangle the effects of  
the changes in the quota system from the effects of other factors in 
explaining changes in individuals’ job satisfaction. Still, we believe that this 
simple sub-analysis combined with the findings of our main analysis should 
shed light on the changes in the overall employment situation for people 
with disabilities and their perception about the workplace and current jobs 
before and after the changes in the quota system in South Korea.  
IV. Data 
The primary data source for this study is the Korean Labour and Income 
Panel Study (KLIPS). The KLIPS is a longitudinal survey that collects 
information on all family members of 5,000 urban households representing a 
random sample of the South Korean population. The survey is conducted 
annually and the same set of questions is asked of the same set of households 
repeatedly in each wave. The first wave of the survey was conducted in 1998 
and, currently, the KLIPS includes 10 waves; the last publicly-available 
wave represents data for the year 2007.  
Despite the fact that the first wave of the survey was conducted in 1998 
and the respondents have been followed for 10 years, only since the sixth 
panel (2003) has the set of disability questions been included in the 
questionnaire. Therefore, the panels used in our research inquiry were 
limited to those from 2003 and onward. Unfortunately, the absence of 
disability identifiers in the first five waves of the survey limited our ability to 
verify empirically whether any observed changes in labour market fortunes 
of individuals with disabilities after 2003 were simply artefacts of the long-
term trends in employment fortunes of individuals with disabilities in South 
Korea, trends which could be independent of the recent transformation in the 
quota system.  
The KLIPS contains both household- and individual-level variables. The 
longitudinal aspect of the KLIPS enables one to observe not only changes in 
household composition, financial resources and consumption over time but 
also changes in individual-level information on income-earning, education 
and vocational training activities, health status, employer characteristics and 
individuals’ self-rated satisfaction with work and life. This gives a unique 
opportunity for researchers to evaluate with better precision the effectiveness 
of a number of employment-related initiatives implemented in South Korea 
within the survey period.  
The main objective of our study is to quantify the effect of the changes in 
the quota system parameters on the labour force participation and 
employment rates of individuals with disabilities relative to non-disabled 
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counterparts. Keeping in mind that the drastic changes in the quota system 
occurred within a two-year window from early 2004 to the beginning of 
2006, to carry out the proposed before–after comparative analysis, we 
created an analytical sample of South Korean urban workers capturing  
their employment statuses along with individual-level and contextual 
characteristics for the period between 2003 and 2007, the years for which the 
disability statuses of respondents were observable in the survey. To avoid 
any simultaneity in employment, education and retirement decisions, we 
restricted our sample to workers who were over 25 but below 60 years of age 
in the first year of the study period, which is 2003. The average effective 
retirement age in South Korea was 70 years for men and 67 years for women 
in the study period.12 However, individuals become eligible for government-
provided retirement benefits at age 60. Therefore, we decided to restrict the 
age of respondents in the first observation to 60. Furthermore, we dropped 
observations for four individuals whose education status was missing. 
Table 2 provides the detailed information about the way the key variables 
of interest were constructed in our study. The pivotal variable in our analysis 
is an indicator of whether a respondent has a disability. We constructed the 
disability indicator based on individuals’ responses to a set of questions 
identifying the presence of any sensory or mental impairments, difficulties 
with activities of daily living (ADLs), difficulties with instrumental activities 
of daily living (IADLs) and any participation restrictions in outdoor 
activities. Specifically, the respondents who answered affirmatively to one of 
the disability-related questions in the 2003 panel were identified as disabled. 
This strategy left us with a time-invariant measure of disability that is 
identified at the time before major changes in the quota system actually took 
place in South Korea. Our empirical strategy is dictated by our expectation 
that an increase in the number of available positions in South Korea due to 
the new initiatives targeted at improving labour market outcomes for 
individuals with disabilities might have a positive impact on the likelihood 
of reporting a work-related disability in the survey. As a result, to avoid any 
potential simultaneity between reporting disability and employment, we 
identified the group of individuals with disabilities based only on their 
reporting of disability in the 2003 panel before any drastic changes in the 
parameters of the quota system. We dropped from the sample 622 
individuals (out of 7,439) who did not report the presence of any disabling 
condition in the 2003 panel but who reported at least one condition in the 
later panels. This empirical approach limits our identification of the impact 
of the changes in the quota system to the impact on individuals who were 
disabled before the actual changes in the disability employment system and 
excludes the impact on individuals who acquired functional limitations or  
 
12OECD, 2014. 
 
© 2015 Institute for Fiscal Studies 
Fiscal Studies © 2015 Institute for Fiscal Studies 
 
 Evaluation of the employment quota system in South Korea 111 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Construction of the key variables 
Variables Description Type of 
variable 
Disability Is visually, auditory or speech impaired Binary 
{0,1} Has difficulty walking, climbing stairs, 
lifting heavy objects 
Has persistent difficulties in: learning, 
remembering, concentrating; indoor 
activities (dressing, bathing, etc.); outdoor 
activities (shopping, going to the hospital 
etc.) 
In labour force Is recognised as working in the consolidated 
employment variable (p_0201) of KLIPS or 
was searching for a job in the past month 
and was able to work 
Binary 
{0,1} 
Employed Is recognised as working in the consolidated 
employment variable (p_0201) of KLIPS 
Binary 
{0,1} 
Age Aged between 25 and 60 in 2003 Continuous 
Male Reported being male Binary 
{0,1} 
Elementary education Level of education is elementary schooling 
or no schooling  
Binary 
{0,1} 
Secondary education Level of education is lower or upper 
secondary 
Binary 
{0,1} 
Vocational education Level of education is a two-year college 
degree or a vocational, technical or associate 
degree 
Binary 
{0,1} 
College education Level of education is university (four years 
or more) or graduate school (masters or 
doctoral) 
Binary 
{0,1} 
Married Current marital status is married, with 
spouse 
Binary 
{0,1} 
Non-earned income Total individual pre-tax yearly earned 
income subtracted from the sum of 
household total earnings, interest from 
savings in banks and other financial 
institutions, net monthly rent, amount of 
benefit from social insurance, basic 
livelihood security benefits and some other 
income  
Continuous 
Province unemployment rate Official annual unemployment rate in the 
respondent’s province of residence (numbers 
from the official website of Statistics Korea 
for years between 2003 and 2007 inclusive) 
Continuous 
Self-reported health Rates current health condition as excellent, 
good, fair, poor or very poor 
Categorical 
{1,2,...,5} 
Region Region of residence Categorical 
{1,2,...,5} 
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FIGURE 1 
Disability prevalence in the analytical sample  
 
Source: KLIPS, 2003–07. 
 
impairments after 2003. However, we still believe that our findings convey 
information about the labour market fortunes of the majority of individuals 
with disabilities in South Korea.  
It is worth mentioning that the constructed disability indicator to some 
extent captures the conceptualisation of disability as outlined by the 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). 
According to the ICF, disability can be categorised into three broad concepts 
through the presence of any of: (1) health condition and impairment; (2) 
activity limitation; and (3) participation restriction.13 Our measure of 
disability shows that the prevalence of disability in our sample fluctuated 
between 7.3 and 7.6 per cent within the study period (see Figure 1). It should 
be noted that self-reported disability in the KLIPS does not match precisely 
the disability definition used by the quota system, which requires self-
identification at a local government office. The definition of disability used 
by government officials to identify disabled workers requires the presence of 
a substantial long-term impairment in daily or social life activity due to 
physical or mental disability. Specifically, the government standard defines a 
mental disability as ‘a disability caused by a psychological development 
disorder or a mental disease’ and a physical disability as ‘a disability of 
principal external bodily functions or internal organs’.14 
The KLIPS distinguishes between individuals who worked and those who 
did not work in the survey week. Employment status is given by a single 
variable constructed using different employment-related questions asked of 
each respondent in the individual questionnaire in each panel. However, for 
our analysis, it is crucial to identify not only respondents’ employment status 
but also their labour force participation status. We use recommendations 
13Hale, Hayghe and McNeil, 1998; Wittenburg and Nelson, 2006. 
14Act on the Welfare of Persons with Disabilities, Article 2. 
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given in the KLIPS user guides15 to construct the latter indicator. 
Specifically, we use the aforementioned consolidated employment variable 
to identify those who were employed at the time of the survey and add those 
who were involved in any active job-search activities up to one month before 
the survey or who identified themselves as able to work if any suitable 
position were available in the survey week. Using this strategy, we find that 
labour force participation has been slightly declining for individuals without 
disabilities for the period between 2003 and 2007 (from 75.1 per cent to 74.9 
per cent) and increasing from 42.5 per cent to 45.1 per cent for individuals 
with disabilities (see Figure 2). This visual investigation of employment 
patterns provides evidence of certain changes in the labour force 
participation rate among individuals with disabilities relative to their non-
disabled counterparts in South Korea after the changes in the quota system. 
Unlike labour force participation, the unemployment rate among 
individuals with disabilities changed drastically after the major changes in 
the quota system from 2004 to 2006. Figure 3 shows that the unemployment 
rate for individuals with disabilities in our sample decreased from 9.3 per 
cent in 2003 to 5.5 per cent in 2007 and that the decline in the 
unemployment rate was steady across these years with the exception of 2006 
when the unemployment rate increased relative to 2005. The figure also 
shows that the unemployment rate for individuals without disabilities 
decreased slightly after 2005, suggesting that other factors – possibly 
including macroeconomic factors – might be responsible for observed 
changes in the unemployment rate for individuals with disabilities.  
FIGURE 2 
Labour force participation rate in the analytical sample, by disability status 
 
Source: KLIPS, 2003–07. 
15Korean Labour Institute, 2013. 
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FIGURE 3 
Unemployment rate in the analytical sample, by disability status 
 
Source: KLIPS, 2003–07. 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics for the analytical sample 
Variable All Disabled Non-disabled 
In labour force 72.90% 44.23% 75.21% 
Employed  95.61% 92.63% 95.75% 
Self-reported health 2.50 3.52 2.42 
Age 43.06 50.18 42.49 
Male 50.97% 46.46% 51.33% 
Married 79.89% 67.84% 80.86% 
Province unemployment rate  3.71% 3.65% 3.71% 
Elementary education 9.65% 35.61% 7.56% 
Secondary education 54.25% 52.64% 54.38% 
Vocational education 10.71% 5.62% 11.11% 
College education 25.39% 6.13% 26.94% 
Region 1 44.73% 42.66% 44.89% 
Region 2 44.78% 43.92% 44.85% 
Region 3 5.97% 8.85% 5.74% 
Region 4 2.30% 2.99% 2.24% 
Region 5 2.22% 1.57% 2.27% 
Non-earned income (log) 2.21 2.21 2.21 
Note: ‘Employed’ is conditional on labour force participation. The unemployment rate of the analytical 
sample over the study period can be computed by subtracting the percentage of individuals ‘employed’ 
from 100 per cent. ‘Province unemployment rate’ is the average annual unemployment rate in the 
respondent’s province of residence, obtained from Statistics Korea.  
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Finally, in Table 3, we provide descriptive statistics on all variables used 
in our empirical inquiry broken down by disability status. The comparison of 
self-reported health across the two groups shows that the average person 
with a disability rates their health close to ‘poor’, while their non-disabled 
counterpart is more likely to rate their health as ‘good’ or ‘fair’.16 The 
average individual with a disability is seven years older than their non-
disabled counterpart, is less likely to be male (46.5 per cent versus 51.3 per 
cent) or married (67.8 per cent versus 80.9 per cent), is more likely to have 
the highest educational attainment as elementary education (35.6 per cent 
versus 7.6 per cent) and less likely to have vocational or college education 
(11.8 per cent versus 38.1 per cent), and has an identical log of non-earned 
income (both 2.2). The unemployment rate for the sample of individuals 
used in our analysis is 4.4 per cent (100 per cent minus the percentage of 
employed individuals conditional on labour force participation from Table 
3), which is slightly above the official unemployment rate for the study 
period of 3.7 per cent (‘Province unemployment rate’ in the first column of 
Table 3). The minor discrepancy between the unemployment rate in the 
analytical sample and the official number can be explained by our sample 
selection strategy: only workers aged between 25 and 60 at the first 
interview were included in our sample, while the official number is 
calculated for all workers above 15 years old.17  
V. Results 
1. Cross-sectional analysis 
As we outlined in Section III, the main empirical strategy of our analysis is 
to estimate separately for each year a binary response model of the 
individual’s employment decision with initial selection into the labour force. 
Then, using the point estimates of the binary response model for the given 
year, we compute the predicted probabilities of labour force participation 
and employment, switching the disability index from 1 to 0. Finally, we 
compute the averages of these probabilities and, combining the computed 
statistics with other years, we depict them in a single graph to observe the 
main trends in the predicted probabilities of employment and labour force 
participation between 2003 and 2007 for individuals with disabilities and 
then compare them with the probabilities computed for their non-disabled 
counterparts.  
Figure 4 shows that after controlling for differences in observed 
characteristics and changes in labour market conditions, the predicted  
 
16A higher value of self-reported health is an indicator of poorer health status. 
17Statistics Korea, 2014. 
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FIGURE 4 
Simulated probabilities of employment (taking selection into the labour market into 
account) and labour force participation for disabled individuals 
 
Note: The simulated employment probability is computed after taking selection into the labour market 
into account. Both probabilities are the averaged probabilities computed for the entire sample using the 
coefficients reported in Table 4 and actual values for independent variables included in Xi1 and Xi2. 
Source: KLIPS, 2003–07. 
 
probabilities of both employment and labour force participation for 
individuals with disabilities steadily increased after 2004. Specifically, the 
probability of employment (after controlling for selection into the labour 
market) increased from 91.6 per cent in 2004 to 95.4 per cent in 2007. 
Similarly, the predicted probability of labour force participation increased 
from 51.5 per cent in 2003 to 56.6 per cent in 2007. These patterns in the 
data may serve as partial evidence that the labour market fortunes of 
individuals with disabilities may have improved in South Korea after the 
adoption of new employment incentives aimed at increasing the hiring and 
employment of targeted individuals in competitive settings. 
To demonstrate that the changes in the quota system only affected 
individuals with disabilities, we then contrast the above probabilities with 
the probabilities computed for non-disabled counterparts. Figures 5 and 6 
show that the predicted probabilities of employment (after controlling  
for selection into the labour market) and of labour force participation for 
individuals without disabilities did not change substantially in the study 
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period: the labour force participation probability fluctuated around 75 per 
cent and the employment probability fluctuated around 96 per cent. In 
contrast, the predicted probabilities of labour force participation and of 
employment for people with disabilities, as discussed above, visually 
increased starting from 2004. These findings are compatible with our 
conceptual expectations: the changes in the quota system should not have 
any spillover effect on labour market opportunities for individuals without 
disabilities and should only affect the labour market fortunes of individuals 
with disabilities. However, based on this analysis, we are still unable to 
verify whether these observed improvements in labour force participation 
and employment (taking selection into the labour market into account) for 
individuals with disabilities are statistically significant relative to non-
disabled counterparts. To answer this question, we performed the difference-
in-difference analysis with the pooled sample. 
FIGURE 5 
Simulated probability of labour force participation, by disability status 
 
Note: The predicted probability of labour force participation is the averaged probability of labour force 
participation computed for each observation using coefficients reported in Table 4 and the actual values 
of independent variables in Xi1 only varying the disability index between 0 and 1. 
Source: KLIPS, 2003–07. 
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FIGURE 6 
Simulated probability of employment (taking selection into the labour market into 
account), by disability status 
 
Note: The simulated employment probability is computed after taking selection into the labour market 
into account. The predicted probability of employment is the averaged probability of employment 
computed for each observation using coefficients reported in Table 4 and the actual values of independent 
variables in Xi2 only varying the disability index between 0 and 1. 
Source: KLIPS, 2003–07. 
 
2. Difference-in-difference analysis with the pooled sample 
In this analysis, by pooling data for all years, within the bivariate probit 
model with selection, we estimated the effect of disability on labour force 
participation and employment and the interactions of the disability indicator 
with year fixed effects. The statistical significance of these interaction terms 
for the years after the major changes in the quota system should provide  
us with evidence of whether the changes in labour market outcomes for 
individuals with disabilities after the changes in the quota system were 
substantial relative to those of their non-disabled counterparts. Results 
reported in Table 4 show that the probability of labour force participation 
increased steadily from 2003 with statistically significant results only for 
2006 and 2007. At the same time, while the probability of employment also 
increased for individuals with disabilities relative to their non-disabled 
counterparts in the years after 2003, those changes in the employment 
probability were not statistically significant at any conventional levels.  
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TABLE 4 
Results of bivariate probit model with selection 
Variable Labour force participation Employment 
Coeff. Std error z-stat. Coeff. Std error z-stat. 
Socio-demographic characteristics       
Age 0.249*** 0.015 16.43 0.041* 0.021 1.95 
Age squared –0.003*** 0.000 –16.32 0.000 0.000 –1.44 
Self-reported health –0.204*** 0.017 –12.18 –0.041 0.026 –1.61 
Male 1.184*** 0.033 35.84 0.006 0.050 0.11 
Married –0.202*** 0.042 –4.78 0.319*** 0.046 7.00 
Log of non-earned income –0.066*** 0.008 –8.08    
Unemployment rate –0.025 0.021 –1.17 –0.016 0.026 –0.62 
Educational group 
(elementary is the reference group) 
      
Secondary –0.272*** 0.061 –4.47 –0.062 0.072 –0.86 
Vocational –0.267*** 0.079 –3.37 –0.044 0.091 –0.48 
College –0.215*** 0.073 –2.95 0.184** 0.086 2.14 
Region 
(region 1 is the reference group) 
      
Region 2 0.109*** 0.032 3.36 0.023 0.038 0.61 
Region 3 0.091 0.071 1.27 0.170* 0.093 1.83 
Region 4 0.198** 0.096 2.07 0.243* 0.133 1.83 
Region 5 0.055 0.099 0.56 0.582*** 0.140 4.14 
Disability indicator and its 
interactions with year fixed effects 
      
Disability  –0.805*** 0.074 –10.95 –0.216 0.134 –1.61 
Year 2004 × Disability 0.019 0.057 0.33 0.023 0.183 0.13 
Year 2005 × Disability 0.043 0.069 0.62 0.156 0.193 0.81 
Year 2006 × Disability 0.140* 0.075 1.89 0.070 0.184 0.38 
Year 2007 × Disability 0.194*** 0.076 2.56 0.095 0.197 0.48 
Constant –3.926*** 0.324 –12.10 0.587 0.454 1.29 
ρ (correlation of errors) –0.223*** 0.078 –2.86    
        
No. of observations 30,233 
Note: Year fixed effects are also included in the set of covariates. The statistic of the Wald test, which 
tests the level of independence of the equations, is 7.66 with p-value < 0.01, implying that the two 
equations are not independent. * indicates statistically significant at 10 per cent level, ** statistically 
significant at 5 per cent level and *** statistically significant at 1 per cent level. 
 
Taking into consideration the findings of the two separate analyses, we 
end up with mixed evidence about the effectiveness of the new initiatives in 
disability employment policy for the labour market fortunes of individuals 
with disabilities in South Korea. On the one hand, we observe a visual 
increase in both labour force participation and employment rates (after 
controlling for selection into the labour market) for the representatives of the 
targeted group of the population. On the other hand, the improvement in 
labour force participation for individuals with disabilities is only translated 
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into a marginal improvement in the probability of employment (after taking 
selection into the labour market into account) relative to their non-disabled 
counterparts.  
3. Severity of disability and employment outcomes 
One of the goals of this paper is to evaluate the importance of subsidies in 
disability employment policy in South Korea and their impact on the 
employment outcomes of individuals with disabilities. Despite the fact that 
the main aim of subsidies is to create incentives for employers to hire more 
disabled individuals regardless of the severity of the disabling conditions, 
one of the criticisms of the quota system is that it actually fails to improve 
the labour market fortunes of the most severely disabled individuals. We 
implicitly test whether the level of subsidy in South Korea is adequate and 
generates better employment outcomes not only among individuals with 
disabilities in general, but also for those who have more severe disabilities. 
In Table 5, we report the results of a bivariate probit model with selection 
that incorporates severity of disability as measured by the number of 
affirmative responses to the three different disability questions reported in 
Table 2. Specifically, the number of disabilities (ranging from zero to three) 
is entered in the model in the form of indicators, with the absence of any 
disability as the reference group, and interacted with a time dummy 
identifying observations for years 2006 and 2007. Our earlier analysis shows 
that the largest effects occurred during these two years, the years after major 
changes in the quota system in South Korea took place. The results in Table 
5 suggest that the labour force participation rate for those with one reported 
condition increased relative to that for non-disabled counterparts. Moreover, 
individuals with two reported conditions experienced a larger increase in 
labour force participation rate compared with individuals with a single 
condition, suggesting that the level of subsidies may have a larger impact on 
labour force participation for this group of individuals with more severe 
disabilities. As predicted by critics of the quota system, the labour force 
participation rate of the most disabled individuals – those who reported all 
three disabling conditions – did not change much relative to their non-
disabled counterparts. Finally, relative to individuals with no disabling 
conditions, the employment prospects of any of the disability groups did not 
change after 2005.  
These findings may imply that although firms in South Korea have 
incentives to generate extra revenue by using a more disabled workforce, 
they may still be unwilling to accommodate severely disabled individuals or 
may have certain negative stereotypes about their ability to work and be 
productive entities in the workplace, suggesting that the quota system in  
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TABLE 5 
Results of bivariate probit model with selection 
Variable Labour force participation Employment 
Coeff. Std error z-stat. Coeff. Std error z-stat. 
No. of disabling conditions (zero 
conditions is the reference group) 
and interactions with 2006 and 
2007 year fixed effect 
      
One condition –0.575*** 0.077 –7.44 –0.075 0.107 –0.70 
Two conditions –1.066*** 0.117 –9.12 –0.420** 0.163 –2.57 
Three conditions –1.817*** 0.252 –7.21 –0.323 0.339 –0.95 
After 2005  0.010 0.018 0.54 0.019 0.035 0.53 
One condition × After 2005 0.113* 0.062 1.82 0.078 0.161 0.48 
Two conditions × After 2005 0.315*** 0.113 2.78 –0.067 0.209 –0.32 
Three conditions × After 2005 0.048 0.148 0.32 0.236 0.576 0.41 
Note: Year fixed effects are also included in the set of covariates. * indicates statistically significant at 10 
per cent level, ** statistically significant at 5 per cent level and *** statistically significant at 1 per cent 
level. 
 
reality fails to improve the employment prospects of severely disabled 
individuals.  
4. Job satisfaction in 2003 and 2007 
Finally, we investigated the changes in job satisfaction for individuals with 
disabilities relative to their non-disabled counterparts within a parsimonious 
analysis. In each wave, all employed KLIPS respondents respond to the 
block of job satisfaction questions. Based on the responses of individuals 
with disabilities, we constructed 15 binary variables indicating whether a 
particular individual with a disability strongly agrees or agrees with a 
certain statement related to his/her current job or is strongly satisfied or 
satisfied with a certain condition in his/her current job. The description of all 
the job satisfaction questions is given in Table 6 along with results from the 
statistical analysis. In the non-parametric analysis, we compared the 
percentage of strongly agree / agree or strongly satisfied / satisfied 
responses given by working individuals with disabilities in 2003, with the 
equivalent percentage of responses given in 2007, after the full introduction 
of all the new disability employment regulations. The simple before-and-
after comparison shows that individuals with disabilities responded more 
affirmatively to all job satisfaction questions in 2007 than in 2003. 
Specifically, we found that more individuals with disabilities were enjoying 
their jobs in 2007 than in 2003 (36 per cent versus 28 per cent). About 25 per 
cent of employed individuals with disabilities reported in 2007 that they 
were satisfied with their working hours, which is almost 10 percentage  
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TABLE 6 
Overall job satisfaction before and after the changes in the quota system 
Description With disability Without disability Difference-in-
difference 2003 2007 Difference χ2 2003 2007 Difference χ2 
I’m satisfied with the job I’m currently doing 0.242 0.299 0.057 1.57 0.401 0.429 0.028** 6.60 0.029 
I’m glad to have joined this company 0.368 0.385 0.017 0.11 0.509 0.466 –0.043*** 15.36 0.060 
I enjoy this job 0.284 0.364 0.079* 2.72 0.446 0.453 0.007 0.44 0.072 
I feel this job to be personally rewarding 0.300 0.342 0.042 0.77 0.408 0.400 –0.008 0.55 0.050 
I want to continue this job if other things 
remain the same 
0.474 0.599 0.125** 5.94 0.585 0.622 0.037*** 11.74 0.088* 
Satisfied with wages 0.058 0.091 0.033 1.49 0.143 0.157 0.014* 3.21 0.019 
Satisfied with stability of employment 0.206 0.251 0.045 1.08 0.343 0.396 0.053*** 24.57 –0.008 
Satisfied with content of the work 0.232 0.299 0.068 2.23 0.380 0.422 0.042*** 15.10 0.026 
Satisfied with work environment 0.184 0.214 0.030 0.52 0.281 0.330 0.049*** 23.35 –0.019 
Satisfied with work hours 0.153 0.251 0.099** 5.71 0.284 0.334 0.049*** 23.17 0.050 
Satisfied with possibility of personal 
development 
0.163 0.187 0.024 0.38 0.238 0.265 0.027*** 7.74 –0.003 
Satisfied with communication or personal 
relationships 
0.247 0.289 0.041 0.82 0.325 0.372 0.047*** 19.72 –0.005 
Satisfied with fairness of promotion 0.080 0.094 0.014 0.13 0.156 0.191 0.035*** 11.50 –0.020 
Satisfied with corporate welfare 0.050 0.065 0.015 0.23 0.149 0.187 0.038*** 14.42 –0.023 
Satisfied with main job 0.175 0.222 0.047 1.30 0.258 0.312 0.054*** 29.83 –0.007 
Note: χ2 statistic from the Pearson’s chi-squared test. * indicates statistically significant at 10 per cent level, ** statistically significant at 5 per cent level and *** statistically significant at 1 
per cent level. 
 
© 2015 Institute for Fiscal Studies 
Fiscal Studies © 2015 Institute for Fiscal Studies 
 Evaluation of the employment quota system in South Korea 123 
 
 
 
points higher than in the 2003 panel. With respect to willingness to stay with 
their current employers if other things remain the same, 60 per cent of 
individuals with disabilities responded affirmatively to this question in 2007, 
a 13 percentage point difference from 2003. Finally, although these are not 
statistically significant differences, more people with disabilities were 
satisfied with their current and/or main job, the stability of employment, 
content of the work, work environment and personal relationships in their 
current workplaces and felt their job to be personally rewarding in 2007 than 
in 2003. 
Further, we examined whether the given improvements in job satisfaction 
for individuals with disabilities were significant relative to changes in job 
satisfaction for individuals without disabilities. We found that, in general, 
there were no significant differences between the responses of individuals 
with and without disabilities to the job satisfaction questions between 2003 
and 2007, with the exception of one statistically significant trend: individuals 
with a disability had a larger change in rating for the item ‘I want to continue 
this job if other things remain the same’. The findings of this parsimonious 
analysis demonstrate that the new regulations in the quota system in South 
Korea might have no impact on disabled individuals’ job satisfaction relative 
to their non-disabled counterparts.  
VI. Conclusion 
Further expanding the disability policy literature, this study exploits the 
structural changes in South Korea’s disability employment quota system  
in 2004 and 2006 in order to understand their impact on the prospect of 
employment and on job satisfaction for individuals with disabilities. Our 
results show that starting from 2004, relative to non-disabled counterparts, 
labour force participation among individuals with disabilities has improved; 
however, this finding may be part of a longer-term trend in people’s labour 
market fortunes that we cannot observe using these data. Meanwhile, the 
probability of employment (after controlling for selection into the labour 
market) among this segment of the population has shown some 
improvement, but the observed improvement has not been substantial 
relative to non-disabled counterparts. Furthermore, our results show that in 
2007 as compared with 2003 (prior to the changes in the quota system), 
individuals with disabilities reported being more satisfied with their jobs; 
however, the increases in job satisfaction were about the same as those 
reported by individuals without disabilities. In fact, for certain work 
characteristics, the evidence points toward smaller increases in job 
satisfaction during the study period among the individuals with disabilities. 
Taken together, our findings may suggest that additional opportunities, 
available as a result of increasing (1) the number of employers covered by 
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the quota system, (2) the number of jobs available to individuals with 
disabilities and (3) the financial incentives for employing individuals  
with disabilities, have increased the labour force participation of people with 
disabilities in South Korea relative to their non-disabled counterparts. 
However, these opportunities have had limited positive impact on the 
probability of employment (after controlling for selection into the labour 
market) and on job satisfaction. 
The major shortcomings of the quota system in South Korea have been 
extensively discussed in the literature. First, Chun and Yi (2002) surmise 
that the improvement in employment opportunities for individuals with 
disabilities in South Korea primarily affect the less severely disabled 
population, ignoring the needs and desires of the most disabled 
subpopulation. We find evidence that the labour force participation rate may 
have increased more for people with more severe disabilities; however, the 
most severely disabled individuals’ labour force participation remained 
unchanging even after the introduction of substantial incentives to hire 
individuals with disabilities. This latter finding somewhat confirms the 
earlier criticism of the quota system in South Korea. 
Second, Kim (2010) points out that ‘the compulsory hiring of persons 
with disabilities will be more effective when an anti-discrimination policy 
and an equal employment opportunity policy are more deliberately devised 
and strictly implemented with accommodation provisions’. Our analysis 
shows that only 21 per cent of employed individuals with disabilities 
reported being satisfied with their work environment in 2007, which is only 
a 3 percentage point improvement after the adoption of new incentives and 
which lags the similar statistic for their non-disabled counterparts by  
12 percentage points. First, it should be a concern of South Korean 
policymakers that a substantial gap exists in the level of satisfaction with the 
work environment between the two groups of individuals. Furthermore, after 
the introduction of the new initiatives, disabled individuals’ satisfaction  
with their work environment improved at a lower rate than the rate of 
improvement experienced by non-disabled counterparts. This suggests that 
the observed increase in job satisfaction among individuals with disabilities 
was part of the overall improvement of work environments in South Korea 
and not related to the recent changes in the quota system. Therefore, if the 
goal of the South Korean government is to improve workplace experience 
along with employment prospects of individuals with disabilities relative  
to non-disabled counterparts, the recent quota system initiatives could be 
complemented with employer education around employment non-
discrimination, workplace inclusion, disability awareness and reasonable 
accommodation. 
Finally, Kim (2010) stresses the existence of only a short-term effect of 
the quota system on employment prospects for individuals with disabilities, 
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without any longer-term improvements. Unfortunately, we only had data 
covering two years after the major changes in the quota system took place, 
limiting our ability to quantify the longer-term effects of the new disability 
employment initiatives. Furthermore, due to the unavailability of disability 
indicators prior to 2003, in this study we were not able to test whether the 
observed improvement in labour force participation among individuals with 
disabilities was part of longer-term trends in the labour market fortunes of 
this segment of the population in South Korea. Overall, despite the 
limitations of our current data source, we can conclude from our findings 
that the new disability employment initiatives did not have a major impact 
on the disability employment situation in South Korea.  
As the US and other countries consider their own disability employment 
situations, they can learn from studies such as this one on the effectiveness 
of quota systems. To better understand the impact in a country’s own unique 
context, it is possible to ‘test out’ such a system. For example, in the US, a 
quota-like system is being implemented for a select group of employers. 
Specifically, the US Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programmes 
recently released regulations updating Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, adding a disability employment ‘utilisation goal’ for businesses 
with federal contracts or subcontracts. Federal contractors will be required to 
invite applicants and employees regularly to self-identify as an individual 
with a disability. Employers will need to track these data and their progress 
toward meeting a utilisation goal of 7 per cent across job categories. These 
changes move toward a quota system, although the system does not have the 
financial incentives of the South Korean and other quota systems. The 
results of our study suggest that such incentives may have some limited 
positive impact on labour force participation and the labour market fortunes 
of people with disabilities. 
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